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MONEY  STOCK  TARGETING,  BASE DRIFT AND 
PRICE-LEVEL  PREDICTABILITY:  LESSONS FROM  THE U.K. EXPERIENCE 
ABSTRACT 
It is controversial  whether  money stock targeting  without  base 
drift  (i.e. following  a trend—stationary  growth  path) makes  the price 
level more predictable  in the presence  of permanent  shocks  to money 
demand.  Developing  a procedure  that does not run into the Lucas 
critique,  and applying  this  procedure  to  the case of the U.K., the paper 
finds  that the variance  of the trend  inflation  rate in the U.K.  would 
have  been reduced by more than one half  if  the Bank of England had not 
allowed base drift. 
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During  the 1970's, a number of countries  attempted  to control 
inflation  and promote price  stability  by targeting  monetary  aggregates. 
In  setting monetary  targets,  a general  practice  has been to calculate 
next period's  target  level on  the  basis of  the actual  rather than the 
(previously-announced)  target level for the  current period.  According  to 
this practice  (hereafter  referred  to as base drift), when the money stock 
diverges  from its target  growth  path,  the divergence  does  not tend to be 
reversed  later and thus results  in  a permanent  change  in the money  stock. 
In  other words,  the money  stock  series would  contain  a unit  root under 
base drift. 
One popular criticism  of the base drift  policy  is that  it would 
introduce  greater uncertainty  about  the long—run  behavior  of the money 
stock,  and thus monetary  targeting  with  base drift  would  not succeed in 
achieving  long-run price  stability.'  Indeed, if  the arguments  of and 
shocks to the money  demand  function  are trend stationary  (so that the 
real  money stock is trend  stationary),  the price level  series  has a unit 
root  if and only if the money  stock  series has a unit  root.  In this 
case,  the price  level is clearly  less predictable  over long periods under 
base drift. 
An interesting  issue in this  context  is why a targeting  policy whose 
major  goal  is long—run  price  stability  would allow base drift  under these 
circumstances.  Goodfriend  (1987) has suggested  the explanation  that  base 
drift  is induced by a tension  arising between the price level  smoothing and  interest rate  smoothing  objectives  of a central bank.  Although  base 
drift  makes  the  price  level  less  predictable over  long  periods  (by 
introducing a  unit  root  into the price  level  series),  it  is  allowed 
because  it also helps  reduce the variability of  interest  rates. 
An  alternative  view  has  been  suggested  by  Walsh  (1986,  1987),  who 
has pointed  out that  if the demand  for money  is subject  to permanent 
shifts,  the price  level would not be trend  stationary  even without  base 
drift.  Indeed, base drift would  offset  the effect of permanent  shocks to 
money  demand  on the price level,  and as Walsh  (1986) has shown  an optimal 
policy  would  involve some  (between zero and full)  base drift.  It is  thus 
possible  that full base drift,  as compared  to no base drift,  would make 
the price  level  more  predictable  over long periods.  The goal  of price 
stability  alone would suffice in this case to  explain why central banks 
follow  the base drift policy. 
The two views on the effect  of base  drift  on the stochastic 
behavior  of the price  level can only be resolved  by an examination  of the 
empirical  evidence.  Such evidence  is difficult  to obtain  because 
satisfactory  structural  models  of price dynamics  are lacking,  and 
therefore,  the econometric  estimation  of  price  behavior  often  relies  on 
reduced—form  equat.ions.  For reasons discussed  in  the well—known  Lucas 
(1976)  critique,  reduced—form  equations  estimated  for a regime of base 
drift  cannot  be used  to predict the behavior of the price level  under a 
counter—factual  regime of no base drift. 
To avoid this problem, the present paper  focuses  on the influence of 
base drift  on the behavior  of  the permanent  component  of the price level 
(the trend price  level).  It can be shown that the forecast  variance  of 
the trend price  level would dominate the forecast  variance  of the actual 3 
price level  over long time horizons  and hence  provide  useful  information 
about  long—term  uncertainty  about  the price level.  It  is  possible, 
moreover,  to estimate  the hypothetical  behavior  of the trend  price level 
under  no base  drift  (on  the basis  of data available  from a base drift 
regime) using  a procedure  developed  in this  paper.  The procedure 
exploits  the widely  accepted  proposition  that money is  neutral  in the 
long run.  Empirical  implementation  of our procedure  requires  estimation 
of the long—run  components  of both  the price  level  and money stock.  We 
estimate  these  components  using an approach that  has its roots  in the 
Beveridge  and Nelson  (1981) method  for decomposing  univariate  series into 
permanent  and transitory  components.2 
Our empirical  work focuses  on the monetary  experience  of the United 
Kingdom  since  1976.  The Bank of England  has allowed  full  base drift  in 
setting  targets for sterling M3,  and has implemented  its target  policy  by 
using  interest  rate control.  Although  other  countries  have also pursued 
monetary  targeting  with base drift,  the United  Kingdom's  experience  with 
this policy  represents  one of  the longest  periods of  targeting  without a 
change  in the control  procedure.  In  addition, the United  Kingdom has 
been less successful  than most other  countries  [e.g.,  the U.S., Canada 
and Germany]  in hitting  its targets  and has experienced  greater 
variability  in its price  level than most  other countries.  Thus the U.K. 
experience  with monetary  targeting  provides  a good case  study  of the 
influence  of base drift  on price stability. 
Section  II  of the paper uses  a model with flexible  prices  and 
rational  expectations  to provide a simple  example of conditions  under 
which  base drift may either  increase or decrease  the forecast  variance  of 
the price  level.  Section  III paves  the way for our empirical  analysis by 4 
introducing  a framework  in which each variable is decomposed  into 
permanent  and transitory  components.  Using this framework,  we then 
explain  our procedure  for estimating  the behavior of the trend price 
level in the absence  of base drift, making  use of  the data  available  from 
a targeting  regime  in its presence.  Applying this  procedure  to the case 
of the United  Kingdom  in section IV, we examine whether  the trend  price 
level in the United  Kingdom  would  have been less predictable  if the Bank 
of England had not  allowed any base drift.  Our results show  that  the 
policy  of no base  drift  would  have  reduced the forecast  variance  of the 
trend  price  level  by slightly  more than one half.  Interestingly,  this 
substantial  reduction  in the variance occurs  even though  the demand  for £ 
M3  in the United  Kingdom  has exhibited  permanent  shifts.  Thus our 
evidence  is  consistent  with the view that base drift  increases  price 
level uncertainty. 
II.  Base Drift  and Price—Level  Variability:  A Simple  Model 
To explore the influence  of base drift on the behavior  of the price 
level, we  begin  with  a simple  stochastic model  that assumes flexible 
prices  and rational  expectations.  As  is  the case  in the United  Kingdom, 
we assume  that  the. central bank  uses an interest  rate control  procedure 
to achieve  its money  stock targets.  We  also assume  that information  on 
the money  stock  and the price  level becomesavilable  (to both the 
central bank  and the public) after a one-period  lag.  Our set—up  is a 
modified  version  of  the  (1981) model that McCallum  used to analyze the 
implications  of an interest  rate policy  rule for price  level  determinacy. 
The key differences  between  our model  and McCallum's  are that we allow 
for the  possibility  of base drift and include a permanent  shock  in the 5 
ironey demand  function.  In McCallum's  rrodel,  the central  bank pursues the 
objective  of interest-rate  smoothing.  Goodfriend  (1981)  has suggested 
that this  objective  induces central banks  to incorporate  base  drift  in 
setting  their  targets.  To keep our theoretical  example  simple, however, 
we assume  that the central  bank is concerned  only with keeping the money 
stock on target (our more general empirical  model  in section  III, 
however, does allow for other goals  such as  interest—rate  smoothing). 
Our model  is described  by the following  equations: 
m 
= 
Pt a  +  e ,  (1) 
at  at_l 




+  '  (3) 
ot 
+ d 
'  (4) 
= (i.e )m1 
(5) 
= -(l/s)[u 
— Et  i(Pt+at+ e)J  ,  (6) 
where m  and  represent  the logarithms  of the money stock  and the price 
level,  r 
is  the nominal  rate of interest, e. a  and dt are white noise 
disturbances,  and the operator  Eti 
denotes the expectation  of the 
indicated  variable  conditional  on information  on  all  variables  in the 
model  up to period  t—1. 6 
Equations  (1) and  (2)  represent  the money market.  The demand  for 
money  is assumed  to depend on a permanent  shock  as well  as a temporary 
shock  et.  For simplicity,  we assume that the permanent  shock  is a random 
walk  while the temporary  shock  is  serially uncorrelated.  Equations  (3) 
and (4) summarize  the goods market.  The variable  in these equations 
is the real  rate of interest,  and like  is assumed to follow a random 
walk.  Following  McCallum  (1981), we assume that an  island' model 
underlies  the determination  of  p  in such a model  would 
represent  an average of  local'  real rates  (that utilize global 
information  on the nominal  interest rate but only local  information n 
prices), we use Etipt+i  rather than 
Etpt+i 
to  express  the expected value 
of the next period's  price level  in (3).  Note  that shocks  to the real 
interest  rate 
(dr) may be correlated  with those to the demand  for money 
(aand/or e) 
but we cannot  be sure about the signs  of these  correlations 
without  further  specification  of the underlying  model.  Finally,  (5)  and 
(6) provide  a simple  characterization  of money-stock  targeting  with 
interest  rate control.  In these equations, prepresents 
the target  level 
of 
mt. 
To simplify  the discussion, we assume  that the target  rate of 
money growth  equals  zero.  The setting of  the target  stock  in (5) allows 
for full  base drift  when e = 0  and  no  base drift when  a  1.  As our 
concern here is to highlight the difference  between  two widely—discussed 
policy  alternatives  of zero  or full base drift, we do not attempt to 
derive  an optimal  policy  rule.  Assuming that the central  bank pursues no 
other  goal, the interest  rate is set in  (6)  such that the expected stock 
of money equals  the target  stock.  Note that given  the one—period 
information  lag, m  can diverge  from  because of unanticipated  changes 
in money demand  and the price  level. 7 
The above model  is easily  solved  by the method  of undetermined 
coefficients  to yield  the following  solutions  for m, Pt 
and 
= (1-e )mi 
+ a 
+ e 
+  d '  (7) 
[ (1 )/(14e )] m1 
- a  +  + d 
,  (8) 
-[e (i.e )/(1496  + 6t_i  (9) 
With no  base  drift, a  =  1,  and  the coefficient of mi equals zero 
in  (7) as well as (8).  In this case m  is a stationary  series  but  is 
still non—stationary  because of permanent  shocks  to both the demand for 
money  and the real rate of interest.  In contrast,  if there  is full base 
drift, a  = 0,  and the coefficient  of mi  equals  1 in both  (7) and (8). 
Now m 
also becomes a non—stationary  series.  Interestingly,  with either 
o  =  1  or  e  = 0,  the coefficient  of rn1 equals  zero  in (9).  In both of 
these  cases 
rt equals  (the  expected  value of  conditional  on t—i 
information),  and thus the behavior  of the interest  rate remains the same 
in the two regimes. 
Letting  and  represent the behavior  of  Pt fore  = 1 and 
o  = 0,  respectively,  and using  (2), (4) (7) and  (8), we have 
= - a t-2 
- ati 
+  +  dt ,  (10) 
= m2 
- a t-2 
+ e1 
+  t_i 
+ d1 
+ dt 
.  (11) 
Comparing  the behavior  of prices in (10) and (11), it is clear  that while 8 
the policy  of full base drift,  as compared  to no  drift,  eliminates  the 




To explore  the influence  of base drift  on  price  variability,  we let 
FV(e ) Et{pt+k(o 
) 
—  Ep.(o)}2, 
e  = 1,  0, denote  the k-period  forecast 
variance  of p,  and use  (2),  (4)  (10) and (11)  to obtain 
FV(1) 
= (k-i) 
2  +  + (k-1)0 
- 2(kl)oad  (12) 
FV(0) 
=  (k-1)(14 )2a +  + (k-1) + 2(kl)(l4)oed  (13) 
where 2 and 
2  are the  variances of a  and  e  while a  and  are the 
a  e  ad  ed 
covariances  between  a and d,  and e and d.  According  to (12) and (13), 
the one—period  forecast  variances  are the same  (and equal to o)  with or 
without  base drift.  However,  for longer  forecast  intervals,  the two 
regimes imply  different  variances.  For k  >  2,  it follows from (12)  and 
(13) that 
FV(0) 
- FV(I)  (k1)[a2 +  (j+28)a 
(14) 
Thus, when k  >  2 the  difference between  the full—drift  and  no—drift 
k—period  forecast  variances  increases with variances  of shocks  e and d 
but decreases  with that of  shock  a.  This difference  is also influenced 
by the covariances  between shocks  a and d, and e and d,  but the direction 
of the influence  would  depend  on whether  these covariances  are positive 
or negative. 9 
As the above  simple analysis  illustrates, which  targeting  regime 
would lead to  a  lower variability  of the price level  is essentially  an 
empirical  question.  In the next  section, we develop  a procedure  that can 
be used to estimate  forecast  variances  of the trend price  level  for the 
two regimes,  using data generated  under the base—drift  regime. 
III.  A Methodology  for Estimating  the Influence of Base Drift  on the 
Trend Price  Level 
Reduced—form  equations [(7) 
— (9)]  for 
rn. Pt 
and r 
in the previous 
section  were derived  from a particular model.  In this section,  we 
consider  reduced—form  equations  for these variables  of a very  general 
form that would  be  consistent  with a broad class  of models of  assets  and 
goods  markets  and of  monetary  policy  rules.  We only  require that the 
underlying  structure  obey certain  minimal restrictions  on the behavior of 
the permanent  components  of these  variables.  To incorporate  these 
restrictions  into the analysis,  each variable is decomposed  into a trend 
or a permanent  component  and a cyclical or a  transitory  component  as 
follows: 
+ 
Ut.,  (15) 
where  is a 3 x  1  vector  of variables mt, P1 r; 
= [t  a 
vector of permanent  components  of these variables;  and 
u 
= [ u1 u2  u3] 
a vector  of  transitory  components.  The permanent 
components  are assumed to evolve  as 
=1  + V 
,  (16) 10 
where y  = [y  12131 
is a vector  of constants  and v 
= [ v1 v2 v] 
a 
vector  of shocks to the permanent  components.  Both u 
and v 
at-c 
covariance  stationary. 
We assume  that money  is  neutral in the long run in the sense that 
the distribution  of permanent components  of real variables  is independent 
of the behavior  of the money  stock.  In this context,  permanent 
components  could  be viewed as representing  values  in the long run or'  the 
"natural"  equilibrium.  The concept of the long—run  equilibrium,  however, 
is often  not well defined and its meaning  differs  from one model to 
another.  For example,  deviations  of variables  from their  long—run values 
are explained  in terms of  price  stickiness  by one approach,  and 
information  lags by another.  The length  of time required  to reach the 
long—run  equilibrium  could thus depend on what type  of short—run  friction 
is assumed. 
To avoid  identifying  the long  run with a specific  period  of time,  it 
'is  appealing to use the concept of the permanent  component  suggested by 
Beveridge  and Nelson  (1981).  According  to  this  concept 
= im (Etyt 
- ky )  .  (17) 
The permanent  components  defined  by (17) represent  forecasts  (after 
adjusting  for deterministic  trends) of corresponding  variables  in the 
future  far enough  to eliminate the influence  of all types of  short-run 
frictions.  These  forecasts,  moreover,  utilize all current  information 
available  in the model.  As discussed  below,  an immediate  implication of 
(17)  is that the shocks to permanent  components  (vt) 
are white  noise 
disturbances.  Also note that one or more components  of Vt can be set 11 
equal  to zero.  In such special cases,  the corresponding  permanent 
component(s)  would  simply follow  a deterministic  trend  line over time. 
Having  defined  our measure of permanent  components,  we next discuss 
two relations  that  link the permanent  components  of  the two real 
variables  in our model,  the real  stock of  money  and the real rate of 
interest.  First,  we assume a  "long—run  demand  for money  of the form: 
(18) 
where  at 
is a random  variable that  represents  shifts  in the long-run 
demand.  Second,  we  express the permanent  component  of the nominal 
interest  rate as 
t t  + E(pt, 
—  (19) 
where  is  the permanent component  of the  real  interest  rate (i.e., the 
natural  rate of interest).  In conformity  with  (17), we use 
Et 
as the 
expectation  operator  but our analysis would  not be affected  if  (as  in our 
model  in  the previous  section) we used Ei 
instead.  Note  that since 
v2is a white  noise,  (16)  implies that the second term in (19) is  a 
constant.  Although  our analysis  in this section makes  use of only the 
long—run  demand  for money it is interesting  to note that  (15) and (18) 
imply  the following  'short—run  money demand: 
- Pt 
=  - 8  rt 
+ e,  (20) 
where e 
= u1 
— u2 +u3,  and is thus a stationary  random  variable. 12 
Using  (16) and  (18), moreover,  =  +  + v1 





and thus  it  represents  either a  random walk or a deterministic 
trend (in the special case  where v 
= 0).  t4e  can, therefore,  consider at 
as representing  permanent  shocks  and e temporary  shocks to money 
demand  in (20). 
Now our assumption  that money  is neutral  in the long  run can be 
restated  as  that  does  not affect  the distributions  of both at 
and 
An important  implication of this assumption  that we exploit below  is that 
the behavior  of both  rand ct 
will be the same under  regimes of full  and 
no base  drift.  Note that we need  not assume  superneutrality  as the 
deterministic  trend  rates of money growth  and inflation  and  are 
assumed  below to be  the same in both regimes.5  The  behavior  of  would 
differ  between the two regimes,  however,  as this series  would  be  a trend 
stationary  process  under no base drift  but non—stationary  under  base 
drift. 
To examine the behavior  of  under  different  regimes,  let the 




+ (1—g )m1 
+ o  .  (21) 
The setting of the money  stock  target in (21) is more general  than (5) in 
that it allows for a deterministic  trend  rate of money  growth  equal to 
y.  We also now consider the possibility  that the central bank  might  be 
concerned  with goals  (such as interest—rate  smoothing)  other  than 
targeting  of the money  stock.  In the theoretical  model  of the previous 
section,  the money  stock deviated  from the target  path because  of the 
one—period  information  lag.  The deviation,  moreover,  was  a white  noise 13 
disturbance.  The pursuit of other  goals would  now provide another  reason 
why the money  stock  would deviate  from the target  path.  The deviations 
of m  frornu 
for this  reason could  be serially  correlated.  The central 
bank policy  is assumed,  however,  to ensure that the money  stock reverts 
to its targeted  path  in the long run.  The difference 
(mt..  ), 
therefore,  would  represent a stationary  series. 
In the discussion  below,  we use the notation x(o 
),  e  = 0,  1, to 
represent  the  value  of a  variable x  under  regimes of full and no base 
drift,  respectively.  The behavior  of the money stock  under the two 
regimes can be derived  from (21)  as 
mt(l) =  +y1t 
+ z(l) 
,  (22) 
mt(O) 
= 
1 + mt_i(O)  + z(0) 
,  (23) 
where  t  is a time trend,  is the value of 
1t 
for t = 0,  and z  m 
- 
-  Since z  is a stationary  series, mt(l) 
is  generated  by  a 
trend—stationary  process while mt(O)  is generated  by a 
difference—stationary  process. 
Now suppose that for a certain period, the central bank  of a country 
follows  a targeting  policy  with full base drift.  We could  use the data 
for this  regime  to estimate (0).  We discuss below  our econometric 
procedure  for estimating  permanent  components.  Here,  we first explain 
how the data for the base—drift  regime can also  be used to  estimate 
t(1). 
Our assumption  of long—run neutrality  of  money implies  that at(1) 
=  (O)  and t(1) 
= (0).  Our model  in this section  also  implies that 
the expected  rate of  trend  inflation  ,  E(p÷1_p), equals 2  (the drift 14 
term in the equation  for  Given  that 2  is the same under the two 
regimes, (1) 
= t(0) according  to (19).  In view  of (18). it follows 




.  (24) 
As (1) =o  according  to (22), (24) shows  that we need estimates 
of only  rnt(O) 
and  in order to obtain  estimates  of 
To estimate the permanent  component  of the money stock  and the price 
level under  base drift, we use a measure that  is based on a rnultivariate 
version  of the Beveridge—Nelson  (1981) methodology.  To explain  this 
measure, we first  note  that  since  is  covariance  stationary,  it will 
have the following  Wold representation: 
+ C(L)€ 
,  (25) 
where  CCL)  C0 
+ 
C1L  + C2L2 
+ ....) is  a 3 x 3 matrix  of polynomials  in 
the lag operator  L,  and  =  a vector  of innovations  in 
Pt and r.  Using  (17) and  (25), it can be  shown  that 
= +j 
+ Et 
,  (26) 
where  0 =  z C. is the matrix  of long—run multipliers.  The measure  of 
i=0 
given  by (26) always  exists.  Also comparing  (26) with (16), it is clear 
that since  each element  of v 
is a linear  function  of the components  of 
it represents  a white  noise process. 15 
It  is  important to emphasize  that while the long—run  neutrality  of 
money  may have  implications  about how structural  disturbances  affect 
permanent  components,  it  does not imply any restrictions  on the effects 
of reduced-form  shocks c  on  (i.e., on the elements  of matrix  0).  For 
example,  given a constant  expected  trend  inflation  rate, a nominal shock 
would  not affect  or  — 
p1  according  to the neutrality  proposition. 
However,  as the shock to the reduced—form  equation  for m(i) 
would in 
general  be a combination  of both nominal and real structural 
disturbances,  its effects  on  or  —  are  not restricted. 
In the above discussed  Beveridge—Nelson  decomposition,  innovations 
in both the permanent  and transitory  components  are the same.  Other 
models  of the decomposition  of  a variable  into permanent  and transitory 
components  allow innovations  in the two components  to  be different  and 
introduce  a priori  restrictions  on correlations  between the two 
innovations.  As Cochrane  (1988) has demonstrated  (in terms  of a 
univariate  process),  however,  the innovation  variance  of  the permanent 
component  is the same regardless  of  what decomposition  is used.  Thus, 
although  we use (26) to estimate the forecast  variances  of (O) 
and 
our estimates  of these  variances would  not change if another model 
of  the permanent—transitory  decomposition  were  chosen. 
As discussed  in the next section, innovation  variances  of p  under 
the two regimes  can be calculated  using  estimates  of 0 and of the 
covariance  matrix  of  derived from  the base drift regime.  To obtain 
these  estimates,  our strategy  is to identify and estimate  an appropriate 
VAR system  for the United  Kingdom.  The VAR system  is then used to  obtain 
estimates  of  0 and the covariance  matrix  of  c. 16 
IV.  Empirical  Results  for the United  Kingdom 
Before  presenting  evidence  on the effect  of base drift  in the United 
Kingdom,  we briefly  describe  the targeting  policy  followed  by the Bank  of 
England.  The Bank  began announcing  monetary  growth  targets  for dates 
from  July 1976.  The decision to  adopt  explicit monetary  targets was 
apparently  taken  in recognition of  the need for monetary  control to limit 
inflation  and sterling  depreciation.  The Bank chose to target  the broad 
aggregate  sterling  M3 (M3 rather than  the narrower  Ml aggregate 
followed  by the U.S. and Canada  for several  reasons.  First,  econometric 
studies  undertaken  in the early  1970's indicated  that the demand  for £M3 
was more stable  than that for Ml.  Second,  £M3 corresponds  more closely 
to items on the asset  side  of  the consolidated  Banking  sector  balance 
sheet which  the Bank  believes it can directly  influence  through  its 
policy [ see Goodhart  (1983)]  .  Since 1982, the Bank has also started 
declaring  targets  for other monetary  aggregates.  But as the experience 
with these  other  targets  is  not very long, this paper  focuses  on the 
Bank's  targeting  of £M3. 
Each year since  1976, the Bank has announced  a target  range  for the 
rate  of growth of £M3.  The target  range normally  applies to a 12—month 
period  and the rate of growth  is calculated  using  the actual  (rather than 
the previously—announced)  stock of  £M3 in a specific  month  of the year  as 
the base.l  This  procedure  thus allows a base  drift  to occur every year. 
Figure  1 shows the behavior of both the actual  and the target  levels of 
£M3.  The target  levels  are calculated  using the mid—points  of the 
announced  target  ranges  for the rates of £M3 growth.  As the figure shows 
actual  £M3 rose significantly  above the target  path during  1980-82. 
Given  the base drift  policy, however,  the target  levels were adjusted 17 
upwards in this period.  This  adjustment  made it possible  for £M3 to stay 
close  to the target path  from the middle  of 1982  to the beginning  of 
1985.  In Figure  1 we also show the hypothetical  target  path that would 
have obtained  if the Bank allowed  no base drift  and used a  rate of money 
growth  equal to  the average  of announced  rates.  It  is clear  from the 
figure that  without  base  drift the target  levels  would  have  been  much 
lower since 1980  and would  have  induced a  very  different  monetary  policy 
than  actually  followed. 
To  hit  its  monetary  targets,  the Bank uses  an interest  rate control 
procedure.  For several years after the Competition  and  Credit Control 
Act  of 1971, the Bank followed  a procedure  similar  to that of the Federal 
Reserve  before  1979  and the Bank of Canada  before  1982,  that is, interest 
rates were  set to make  the demand  for £M3 equal to what the Bank wished 
to supply.  Disillusioned  with the margin of  error  surrounding  the money 
demand  function  in 1972—73, the Bank  switched to a policy  focused 
directly  on the asset  counterparts  to  £M3.  According  to an accounting 
identity based  on consolidating  the balance sheets  of the Bank of 
England's  banking department  and the commercial  banks,  the Bank links 
changes  in £M3 to asset  counterparts  including  as principal  components: 
changes  in bank  lending to  the private  sector; the Public  Sector 
Borrowing  Requirement  (PSBR) less private  lending to the government  i.e. 
the sale of government  securities  (gilts) to the public.  Based on this 
identity and information  about the PSBR  and forecasts  of bank lending, 
market  interest  rates  (such as the rate on 3-month Treasury  bills) are 
set to sell the required  amounts of gilts necessary  to  hit the £M3 
target.8 18 
We  next  discuss the data used to estimate  an empirical  model for the 
United  Kingdom  based  on the methodology  of section  III.  We considered 
both monthly  and quarterly  data.  The variable  r was measured  by the 
3—month Treasury  bill rate expressed  as a fraction,  and m by the 
logarithm  of  £M3.9  Two different  price  indexes,  logarithms  of the 
Consumer  Price  Index  (known as the retail  price  index in the U.K.) and 
the GDP deflator  (available  only on a quarterly  basis),  were used to 
measure  p on  a monthly  and quarterly  basis.10  A month (as compared to a 
quarter)  appears  to be a more appropriate unit of time for the purpose of 
representing  the Bank of England's  policy  of interest—rate  control. 
However,  since the quarterly  data includes  a more satisfactory  price 
index,  this paper  focuses on estimates based  on quarterly  data.  The 
results derived from the monthly model  are not reported  but are similar. 
To facilitate  the selection  of an appropriate  form  of the VR 
system,  Table  1 tests  the three  series, m, p and r, for stationarity  and 
cointegration  for the period  1977:2 to 1985:4.''  Panel A of this table 
presents  two types  of tests of the unit—root  hypothesis  for a univariate 
series:  one based  on  Dickey  and Fuller  (1979) and the other  on Stock and 
Watson (forthcoming).  According to both tests, the results do not reject 
the hypothesis  that the series  in levels of  rn,  p and r all contain a unit 
root.  The indication  of a unit root in the ni  series,  moreover,  is fully 
consistent  with our interpretation  that the Bank's  targeting  procedure 
involves  full base drift.  In the case  of first—differenced  series, the 
unit—root  hypothesis  is rejected  at the conventional  levels  for t,r 
according  to both tests  and for  t.m according  to the Stock—Watson  test. 
The case for rejecting  the hypothesis  for p  is less  strong.  The 
Stock—Watson  statistic  rejects the hypothesis  that a unit  root is present 19 
in p  only at the  17% level.  The Dickey—Fuller  statistic  also  does riot 
reject  the hypothesis  at the conventional  levels  but the standard error 
of  p  (the  coefficient  of the lagged dependent  variable)  for p  is large 
and the power  of the test is not high in this case.12  Thus we do not 
consider  this evidence  to  provide  strong  indication  of non—stationarity 
in Ap. 
Panel B  of Table  1  provides  Stock-Watson  tests  of common  trends  in 
m, p  and r.  As the  results show, the hypothesis  that  these  series  have 
three  distinct  unit  roots is  clearly not rejected  against the alterna- 
tives  of  one or two unit roots.  The absence  of common  trends  in rn,  p and 
r is consistent  with the view that the demand  for money  is  subject to 
permanent  shocks  (the shift  variable at 
contains a unit  root).'3  In view 
of the above evidence,  we  assume  that m, p and  r are first—difference 
stationary  and are not cointegrated with each  other.  We thus  estimate  a 
VAR system where  each of the three  variables  is entered  in the first 
difference  form. 
Before  describing  our results further, we note that as emphasized 
recently  by Cochrane  (1988), tests  of unit  roots have a low power  in the 
sense that it  is difficult  to distinguish  a stationary  series  from a 
stationary  series  plus  a  small  random walk.  It is thus  instructive to 
examine  how big the  random walk component  is in the series.  Cochrane 
(1988)  suggests that the variance of  the shock to the random walk 
component  relative to the variance of the first  difference  of the series 
provides  a good measure  of  the size of the random  walk component.  He 
uses the variance  of the long difference  of the series  (i.e., the 
difference  between  values  over long periods) to estimate  the variance of 
the shock to  the  random walk  component.  The targeting  regime  in the UK 20 
is  not long enough  to provide a satisfactory  estimate  of this statistic. 
However,  as discussed  below we do  estimate  the variance  of A(t) from 
the VAR model  and this  variance  is  large in relation  to the variance of 
p(m).  Thus, at least on  the basis of  the VAR estimates,  the random 
walk components  do not appear to be small in these series. 
The VAR model  is  estimated  over the period  1976:2 to 1985:4 and 
includes  four lags for each variable  (the first  observation  for the 
dependent  variable  is thus 1977:2).  The estimation  period  was not long 
enough to  explore  additional  lags.  We  did consider  models  with two or 
three lags but these were rejected against the alternative  of a  model 
with four lags.  We also introduced  a time trend  in (each equation of) 
the system but as this  variable was found to be insignificant,  it was 
dropped from  the model. 
The Thatcher  administration  which  began in 1979 introduced  a number 
of  programs  including the Medium  Term  Financial  Strategy,  in which an- 
nounced money  growth  targets were  to be reduced over  a  sequence of years. 
This strategy was  intended to give  financial markets some  indication  of 
the government's  objectives.  One issue is whether  the monetary policy 
regime  actually  changed after Thatcher  took office.  Ag4in,  we did not 
have sufficient  degrees of  freedom to  examine whether  VAR coefficients 
were significantly  different  before  and after Thatcher.  As a crude 
attempt to  explore  the influence  of Thatcher,  however,  we  did try a dummy 
variable  (equal to  one after  1979:2, zero otherwise)  in each equation but 
this  variable also  turned  out to be insignificant. 
As the trend  price  level is a random walk,  the one—period  forecast 
variance  of  is the same as the variance of  tp.11  This  variance is 
estimated  from  the VAR system  as follows:  letting  \hsp(O)  and Vp(1) 21 
denote  variances of  Ap under  full and no base drift,  noting that 
= 
1 
+  t(0) 
— r(O)  according  to (24), and using  (26) to 
estimatep(O)  and  ni(O), we  obtain 
Vs(O)  = 
D2z  (27) 
Vip(1)  = 





are the first two rows of matrix  0 under  base drift, and 
is the covariance  matrix  of  shocks c  under the same regime.  As 
discussed  below,  estimates  of D,  and  are readily  obtained  from a 
VAR systetn. 
One general problem  associated with the use of a VAR model  is that 
impulse  response functions  generated  from  VAR residuals  do not generally 
provide meaningful  information  about the effect of structural 
disturbances.  For our present purpose,  however,  it  is easy  to show that 
the variance ofp  remains unchanged  regardless  of whether  it  is 
estimated  in terms  of VAR residuals  or structural  disturbances.  For 
instance,  let the structural  model  be 
= ,  + B(Ly1 
+  (29) 
where  is a vector of  constants,  8(L)  is a  matrix  of polynomials  in the 
lag operator L, and  is  a  vector  of structural  disturbances. 
Premultiplying  both sides of (29) with A1,  we obtain  the following  VAR 
form (that we estimate  in this section): 
=  + F(Ly1 +  (30) 22 
wheree  = A  F(L) = A1B(L) and  = A.  Given  that  (30)  can be 
inverted  to obtain  the moving average  process  (25),  (29)  will imply  a 




Using  (31) it is straightforward  to show  that the  variance of p  in terms 
of  structural  disturbances  is exactly  the same as that  in terms of VAR 
residuals  It can similarly  be shown that any Choleski 
orthogonalization  of shocks  to the VAR system would  not make  any 
difference  to the variance ofp. 
In Table  2 we show certain results from  the VAR model that are 
needed  to estimate  the variance of  p.  Panel A of this  table  shows the 
correlation/covariance  matrix  of the residuals  in the three  equations. 
Panel B displays  the accumulated  responses  (over 10, 20, 30 and 40 
quarters)  of both m  and p  to a unit shock to each of the three 
equations.  The accumulated  responses  do not tend to change  much beyond 
20 quarters.  We use the sums of responses  over 40 quarters  to 
approximate  the long—run multipliers  that correspond  to the elements of 
and 
Using the above  estimates,  rows 1 and 2 of Table  3 show the 
variances  of the trend inflation  rate with and without  base drift [i.e., 
Va(0) and '(1)]  calculated  according  to (27)  and  (28).  As can be seen 
from  the ratio of the two variances  in row 3 of this table,  the variance 
of  under  no base  drift  is less than one—half  of that under base drift. 
Our estimates  thus  imply that a targeting  policy  without  base drift would 23 
have brought about  a large  reduction  in the variability of the trend 
inflation  rate.  To illustrate  this  result, we construct  the series 
and  according  to (24)  and  (26), using  estimates  of  and 
£ 2t 
available  from  the VAR model.  These series  are exhibited  in Figure 
2.  As the figure clearly  demonstrates,the  variability  of the trend 
inflation  rate would  have been much  smaller under  a  policy of no base 
drift. 
As our empirical work is concerned  with  estimating  the effect of 
base drift only on the behavior of the permanent  component  of  the price 
level,  it  is interesting  to  examine  how big the permanent  or the random 
walk component  is in this  series.  As discussed  above,  Cochrane  (1988) 
has suggested  that one way to answer  this question  is to compare the 
variance  of  with that  of  p.  The variance  of A  estimated  for the 
period 1977:2  to 1988:4  is shown  in row 4 of  Table  3.  Comparing  this 
variance  with  our estimate  of the variance of  Ap under  base drift,  row 5 
shows that the latter  is  about  seven times  as large  as the former.'5  The 
size of the permanent  component  thus seems  to be very prominent  in the 
case of the UK price level.'6 
V.  Conclusions  — 
If  the  real  stock  of nney includes  a  random walk  component,  the 
price  level would  not be trend stationary  even if  targeting  policy allows 
no base  drift.  In this case,  it is not clear whether  the presence  of 
base drift  would make  the price  level more or less predictable.  Our 
theoretical  analysis  suggests  that the answer  to this question  depends on 
the  relative  strength of  different  types of shocks.  According  to our 
analysis  in section  II the price  level would  be more  predictable  with 24 
than without  base drift  if permanent  shocks to money  demand  dominate. 
The model  yields  the opposite  result, however,  if shocks  to the real rate 
of interest  (and/or temporary shocks  to  money  demand) domi nate. 
To  obtain empirical evidence on  this issue,  the paper develops  a 
procedure  for estimating  the effect of base drift  on the forecast 
variance  of  the trend price  level or equivalently  the variance  of the 
trend  inflation  rate (which is an indicator  of the predictability  of the 
actual  price  level over long periods).  We find  that the practice of base 
drift  in the U.K. was responsible  for lower predictability  of  the trend 
price  level.  The case  in  favor  of base drift made by  Walsh  (1986) relies 
on the argument  that money demand  is subject  to permanent  shifts.  For 
the U.K.,  the eri'or term  in money  demand  is indeed  non—stationary  but 
despite this  evidence of permanent  shifts  in the U.K.'s  money  demand we 
estimate  that a policy  of allowing  no base drift would have decreased  the 
forecast  variance  of  the trend  price  level  in the U.K.  by more than one 
half. 
This  paper does not explore the issue  of why the Bank of  England 
permitted  base  drift to reduce  the predictability  of the price level  over 
long periods.  The reason may well  lie in Goodfriend's  (1987) explanation 
that base drift  is induced by the objective  of smoothing  interest  rates. 
Such a goal may have been followed by the Bank to ensure  orderly 
financial  markets, to aid the government  in meeting  its fiscal  objectives 
and to stabilize  the exchange  rate. 
The empirical  analysis  in this paper  is based  on a general model 
that  restricts  the underlying  structure  essentially  in requiring that 
money  be neutral in the long—run -— that  is,  the behavior  of permanent 
components  of real variables  be the same  under  different  monetary 25 
regimes.  Although  this paper focuses  on the influence  of base drift, the 
empirical  methodology  can clearly  be used  to examine the effect  of other 
types  of changes  in monetary  regimes on the long—run predictability  of 
the price  level. 26 
Footnotes 
1.  For this and other  criticisms  of the base drift  policy,  see, for 
instance,  Poole  (1976), Friedman  (1982), and Broaddus  and Goodfriend 
(1984).  Also see the  (1985)  report of the Shadow  Open Market 
Committee  and the  (1985) Economic  Report of the President. 
2.  For an extention  of the Beveridge—Nelson  methodology  to multivariate 
models,  see,  for example,  Huizinga  (1987) and King,  Plosser,  Stock 
and Watson  (1987). 
3.  An equation similar to (3)  is derived by McCallum  using  a model  where 
the IS  function  depends  on the real interest  rate  and output  is 
constant.  Such an equation  is  also implied by Barro's  (1981, Chapter 
2) model  in which  both the demand  and supply of output  in each local 
market  are a stochastic  function  of a locally  perceived  real  rate of 
interest. 
4.  For example,  if a Barro (1981, Chapter 2) type  model  underlies  the 
determination  of  and 
at(and/or  et) depends  positively  on output, 
then a positive economy-wide  shock to the supply  of output  would 
decrease  tbut 
increase czt(and/or et) 
via its effect  on Output.  Both 
of  these  variables  would  increase,  however,  in the case of a positive 
economy—wide  shock to the demand  for output. 
5.  It may be argued  that a change in  the average  inflation  rate may 
cause  financial  innovations  which would  alter  the behavior  of 
However,  our assumption  below that 12 
is the same in the two regimes 
implies that the average  inflation  rates would  also tend  to be the 
same over  long periods  (e.g., see Figure  2). 
6.  The Bank first  announced  a monetary target  for M3 in 1976 and then 
shifted  in 1977 to a target  for sterling M3 that excludes 
non—sterling  balances  from  M3. 27 
7.  The base month  was April  for each year from  1976 through  1978, June 
for 1979  and February  for subsequent  years.  The announced target 
ranges  were as follows: 
Year  Target  Year  Target  Year  Target 
1976  9.&-13.0  1977  9.0—13.0  1978  8.0—12.0 
1919  8.0—12.0  1980  7.0—11.0  1981  6.0-10.0 
1982  8.0—12.0  1983  7.0-11.0  1984  6.0—10.0 
1985  5.0— 9.0 
8.  To affect  the Treasury  bill rate, the Bank has used  its short—term 
interest  rate  (originally  the Bank Rate, subsequently  the Minimum 
Lending  Rate and recently the clearing  rate for bills  [see Walters 
(1986), p. 115]). 
9.  The source of both series  is Bank of England,  Quarterly  Bulletin. 
The series  on€M3  is seasonally  adjusted by the Bank.  Quarterly  data 
represent  averages  of monthly data. 
10. The source of both series  is OECD, Main Economic  Indicators.  The 
series  on the GDP deflator  is  seasonally  adjusted. 
11.  With four  lags used in these tests  as well as the VAR model estimated 
below,  the first observation  for the data is 1976:2  which  represents 
roughly the starting  date for announced  targets  in the U.K. 
12.  For  p, the standard  error of  p  equals  .216.  Thus,  for example,  the 
t—valuefpr the hypothesis  that p  = .3  would  be 1.64.  Also note that 
since  the standard  error of  p  is high  in the case of am as well, the 
test of stationarity  also does not have much  pow" for this series. 






rt, according to (20), stationarity of 
twould  imply  that m, p and r are cointegrated. 28 
14. Moreover  the n—period  forecast variance  simply  equals  n times  the 
one—period  forecast  variance  in this case. 
15.  Mote that according  to (15), the ratio of the variance ofpt 
to that 
afApt 
will lie between  zero and one if the  covariance  between 
andu2t  is zero.  This ratio can exceed one if, as in the case of 
our model,  the covariance  between Apt 
and 
Au2t 
is  negative,  and two 
times  the absolute  value of the covariance  is  greater than  the 
variance ofAu2t. 
16. It may also be of interest  to examine  the size of the permanent 
component  in £M3.  Using  the estimate of  the variance  of  AI derived 
from  our VAR model, we find that this variance  is 1.2 times the 
sample  variance  of  m. 29 
Table  1 
Tests  of Stationarity  and Cointegration 
A. Univariate  Series 
Series  p  [  (p )]  g(1,0)  [p—value(%)] 
m  .865 [—1.498]  -5.418  [79.50] 
p  .948 [—1.631]  —2.825  [94.50 
r  .778 [—2.211]  -6.086  [73.75 
.186 [—2.978]  -24.195 [ 2.75] 
.654 [—1.605]  -15.377 [17.00] 
—.077  [—4.107]  —28.385  [  1.00] 
B.  Multivariate  Series 
g(3,2)  [p—value(%)]  g(3,1)  [p—value(%)] 
m, p and r  —12.159 [91.00]  -1.929  [99.75] 
NOTE:  p  is the  coefficient on  the  lagged value  of  the  dependent  variable 
in  a  regression  that also includes  3 lagged  first differences  of 
the dependent  variable,  a constant  and  a  time  trend.  (p) is the 
Dickey-Fuller  (1979)  Statistic that tests the null  hypothesis  that 
p  = 1.  According  to the distribution  tabulated  by Fuller  (1976), 
the critical  value  (corresponding  to  approximately  the same 
degrees  of freedom  as in our test) for  -r (p )  is  —3.24 at  the 10%, 
and —3.60 at the 5% level.  q(1,O)  is the Stock—Watson  Statistic 
(forthcoming)  that tests  the null hypothesis  of one unit root 
against  the alternative  of no unit root; q(3,2)  and q(3,1)  are the 
Stock—Watson  Statistics  testing for  3  unit  roots against the 
alternatives  of 2 and 1 unit roots.  All of these  statistics  use 
linear  detrending  and four lags. 30 
Table 2 
Selected Results from  the VAR Model 
A.  Correlation/Covariance  Matrix  of  VAR Residuals 
.149 * io  —  .069  - .336 
-.634 * 1o  573 * 1o 
.411 
£ 3  459  *  .348  * 10  .125 * 10 
B.  Selected  Long—Run Multipliers 
The Response  to a Unit Shock Suirmied  Over 
Variable  Innovation  10 Quarters  20 Quarters  30 Quarters  40 Quarters 
C 
1 
.709  .494  .486  .489 
C  2  1.189  1.749  1.749  1.743 
.679  .780  .792  .790 
—.857  —1.026  —1.022  —1.020 
2  3.097  3.434  3.421  3.418 
.949  1.077  1.074  1.073 
NOTE:  Innovations, €, 
and €3  represent,  respectively,  residuals in 
the equations  explaining  m,  p and  r.  In panel A, the values 
above  the diagonal  represent  correlation  coefficients  while  those 
on  and below the diagonal  represent  variances  and covariances. 
In panel B, values  represent  responses  to shocks  equal to 1.0 in 
the case  of  each innovation. 31 
Table  3 
Estimates  of Selected  Variances 
Value 
1.  The variance  of  tj with base  drift  .13695 * iü_2 
2.  The  variance of  a1 without  base  drift  .06143 * 
3.  Row 2 divided  by Row  1  .44852 
4.  The variance ofp  with  base drift  .01906 * 102 
5.  Row 1 divided by Row 4  7.1856 32 
FIGURE  1 
The Behavior  of M3 (in logarithms)  Compared  to Target 
Levels  With and  Without  Base Drift 
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